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State Security Networks as the main beneficiary of the results of this thesis and the adminis-
trator of the Krivat framework.  
 
The goal of this thesis was to develop the collaboration process within the Krivat framework. 
Krivat target organisations recognise the need for such an interoperability framework as 
Krivat is and have even called for such a system to be developed, but are now wary of using 
the framework. The thesis takes two possible solutions and, by means of an action research 
and benchmarking, studies their viability in relation to the problem. 
 
The action research studies the Krivat introduction event provided for every new user, where 
the system and its use is taught to the user. For the research, three introduction events were 
observed, providing material for development and reflection.  
 
The benchmarking sought to determine if crisis management exercises would be better in in-
creasing the willingness of the participating organisations to collaborate with one another. To 
this end, a day-long preparedness exercise was observed and a group with extensive exercise 
experience was surveyed about their positive and negative exercise experiences.  
 
The theory basis reviewed for this thesis provided as many insights for the future develop-
ment of the framework as the research into the user introductions and exercises. The action 
research demonstrated the importance of the introduction event to the users, however it 
made clear that the event must be more engaging. There was originally an intention of creat-
ing a set of exercises for the Krivat framework, however this thesis brought home the point 
that there are many well functioning exercises which could utilise Krivat instead of creating 
any additional ones.   
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Tämä opinnäytetyö on kirjoitettu osana opintoja Laurea-ammattikorkeakoulun englanninkieli-
sessä turvallisuusalan koulutusohjelmassa. Työn toimeksiantaja on Suomen Erillisverkot-
konserni, joka Krivat-konseptin ylläpitäjänä myös hyötyy työstä toiminnan kehityksessä. 
 
Tämän työn tavoitteena oli kehittää Krivat-yhteisön sisäistä yhteistoimintaprosessia. Krivatin 
kohdeorganisaatiot tunnistavat tarpeen Krivatille ja ovat sen myös ilmaisseet eri yhteyksissä, 
mutta ovat kaikesta huolimatta epäileväisiä konseptin käyttöönotossa. Tämä työ tutkii kahta 
mahdollista ratkaisua ongelmaan käyttäen toimintatutkimusta ja benchmarkingia tukenaan. 
 
Toimintatutkimuksella perehdyttiin Krivatin käyttäjäkoulutukseen. Tutkimuksen aikana tark-
kailtiin kolmea eri käyttökoulutustapahtumaa, jotka toimivat meteriaalina kehitykselle ja 
pohdinnalle.  
 
Benchmarkingin avulla pyrittiin selvittämään kriisinhallintaharjoitusten mahdollisuuksia toi-
mia osallistujien aktivoijana Krivatin ytheistoiminnassa. Benchmarkingia varten lähetettiin 
kyselytutkimus valikoidulle ryhmälle heidän onnistuneista harjoituskokemuksistaan, sekä 
tarkkailtiin päivän kestänyttä harjoitusta. 
 
Opinnäytettä varten tehty teoriakatsaus tarjosi runsaasti oivalluksia Krivatin kehitystä varten, 
kuten myös työtä varten toteutetut tutkimukset. Toimintatutkimus osoitti käyttäjäkoulutuk-
sen olevan tärkeä vaihe Krivatin käyttöönotossa, mutta osoitti myös että tapahtuman on olta-
va käyttäjiä aktivoivampi ja osallistavampi. Benchmarkingin perusteella todettiin että Krivatia 
varten ei kannata kehittää omaa erillistä harjoitussarjaa, sillä monet jo olemassa olevat har-
joitukset voisivat käyttää Krivatia työkalunaan. 
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 1 Introduction
 
For a number of years, the need for a communications structure for disturbance management 
and situation awareness between organisations has been recognised by many different par-
ties. The Safety Investigation Authority report on the summer storms of 2010 could not have 
made the point better:  
 
“Concerning the 2010 storms, nearly all officials, ICT companies, and electrici-
ty providers have in their suggested developments arrived at the conclusion 
that all those involved in the management of the situation should have at their 
disposal a wide-ranging national situation awareness comprised of information 
from officials.” (Safety Investigation Authority, 2010)  
 
At the initiative of the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA), several critical infrastruc-
ture (CI) operators devised the KRIVAT concept, the aim of which is to facilitate communica-
tion and co-operation of organisations during a major disturbance in order to speed up the 
recovery process and minimize the damages. A community of CI operators, their support or-
ganisations and rescue services was created around the concept, and the management of the 
concept was given to Suomen Erillisverkot Oy (ERVE), a state-owned communications opera-
tor. At the time of writing this thesis, the community comprised of six organisations with ne-
gotiations to include several more organisations ongoing.  
 
Krivat stands for “KRiittisen Infrastruktuurin VArautumisen Tehostaminen” in Finnish, loosely 
translated to “Enhancing the Preparedness of Critical Infrastructure” in English. It is a frame-
work for action, the main purpose of which is to enhance and supplement the existing pre-
paredness and disturbance management activities of critical infrastructure operators during 
major disturbances. (Nortio, 2015) 
 
The concept contains a community comprised of CI operators and their support organisations, 
a system for real-time information exchange between the organisations and support services 
organised by ERVE. The aim of the concept is to reduce damages incurred from major dis-
turbances by on one hand aiding in preparing for the disturbances, and on the other hand by 
speeding up the recovery process once the disturbance has occurred. The advantages of 
Krivat also include better co-ordination of resources between organisations, increased infor-
mation-sharing between organisations, and better situation awareness. (Nortio, 2015) 
 
It is not, however, enough to devise a concept, introduce it to organizations and simply leave 
everything to chance. The member organisations of the Krivat community have their own 
ways of managing a major disturbance that need to be navigated and fitted to work together 
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for the concept to bring its participants the benefits it should. Even though ERVE serves as 
the administrator of the community, it has no authority to force any of the organisations into 
taking any action or doing anything in a particular way. Since the concept is a novel approach 
to major disturbance management, the need to gather experiences and establish guidelines is 
dire. 
 
The aim of this thesis is, by discussing the problems related to bringing so many diverse or-
ganisations together to work on managing a disturbance in operations, to develop the collabo-
ration process of the Krivat framework from what it is now to where participating organisa-
tions would not hesitate to use the tools provided by Krivat and to share information with one 
another. The problems this thesis deals with are centered around the larger themes of shared 
situational awareness, interoperability, communication and crisis management. 
 
The next chapter introduces the key concepts and theoretical framework for this thesis start-
ing with definition of the none-theoretical concepts and moving on to the larger issues involv-
ing more theory. Chapter three discusses the research conducted for this thesis and chapter 
four describes the research results. The conclusions drawn from the research are discussed in 
the final, fifth chapter. 
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2 Key concepts and theoretical framework 
 
The Krivat concept is a unique and only seemingly simple approach to managing crisis situa-
tions and this also reflects on the theoretical framework of this thesis. This chapter describes 
the main larger concepts used in this thesis as well as the theories surrounding the issue. 
 
2.1 Key concepts 
 
One of the most central concepts in this thesis is the concept of major disturbance, and espe-
cially how the term is used. This concept is the term used for those situations Krivat is espe-
cially planned for and where organisations would most need Krivat. The positioning of the 
framework is illustrated below in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Positioning of Krivat 
 
The term major disturbance is so far an exclusively Finnish concept. The term is a direct 
translation from Finnish, and based on the literature review conducted for this thesis, it does 
not show up in any international papers or documents, unless one or more of the authors is 
Finnish.  
 
So far, the most comprehensive definition for the term comes from Strandén et al. (2014) and 
their article on influences of major disturbances on electricity distribution system operators 
(DSOs), which is not to say that the definition would necessarily be the best. While the defini-
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tion offered is much improved from the mostly technical definitions that do not concern with 
the criticality of the situation (also noted in the article cited), the definition Strandén et al. 
offer is still too much focused on the electricity sector. According to the article, a major dis-
turbance is:  
 
“--long lasting and/or a widespread interruption in the supply of electric power 
during which the fire and rescue services and one or more other public actor 
(municipality, police, etc.) need, in addition to the distribution system opera-
tor (DSO) to start implementing measures for reducing possible severe conse-
quences to people and property.” (Strandén et al., 2014)  
 
There is an annoying amount of semantic ambiguity related to the terminology in the litera-
ture. Some sources use ‘crisis’ and ‘disaster’ interchangeably (eg. Seppänen, 2015), others 
have very carefully defined several different terms for types of disturbances to operations 
(eg. Kyrölä, 2010). Making sense of this hodge-podge of concepts could be a thesis in itself, it 
turns out. This thesis does use the term ‘crisis’ interchangeably with ‘major disturbance’ 
where it discusses issues such as crisis management and communication. The term ‘crisis’ is 
defined and discussed in a later section of this chapter. 
 
Another central concept is multi-organisation, used in the context of multi-organisation dis-
turbance management, or multi-organisation crisis response if one is inclined to use the more 
recognised term. By multi-organisation crisis management this thesis means a crisis manage-
ment response where several mainly private organisations from several sectors and jurisdic-
tions cooperate to respond to a major disturbance. A typical such response might include 
three electricity DSOs, two communications operators, and fire and rescue services from two 
municipalities. 
 
Multi-organisation responses to disturbances require at least a rudimentary level of interoper-
ability. Interoperability and the issues relating to communication are discussed in the next 
section.  
 
2.2 Interoperability 
 
Interoperability lies at the heart of the Krivat framework. The term has multiple definitions, 
some more technical than others, but this thesis uses the ACPO (Association of Chief Police 
Officers) definition quoted by Pollock and Coles (2015), which specifically defines interopera-
bility in the context of multi-organisation cooperation as “the capability of organisations or 
discrete parts of the same organisation to exchange operational information and to use it to 
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inform their decision making.” There are two subdivisions to interoperability, technical and 
organisational, with Krivat representing the organisational side.  
 
As far as interoperability frameworks go, Krivat is a text book example of one. According to 
Pollock and Coles, an interoperability framework has a set of rules and agreements to de-
scribe the interactions between the organisations. Such rules and agreements exist in the 
Krivat framework and they concern information exchange and escalation of operations. As the 
framework develops, there are bound to be new rules for interaction to keep everything 
manageable.     
 
The capability to exchange operational information between organisations does not come 
naturally to organisations. In the context of Krivat, many of the member organisations are 
competitors under normal circumstances, and thererfore justifiably cautious in what they 
publish and to whom. The Competition Act 948/2011 (Finland, 2011) prohibits companies 
from entering into contracts and joint ventures  that would prohibit, restrict or skew compe-
tition, including standardising procedures. 
 
As the concept was being formed, one of the issues that was thoroughly investigated was if 
Krivat would pose such a restriction on competition. As a result, all member organisations 
sign a Mutual Aid Agreement which, among other things, specifies rules for the information 
exchange between organisations and how the information received from Krivat can be treat-
ed. In order to make these rules as clear as possible, Krivat information exchange uses the 
Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) in classifying information in those situations when the information 
is not public. Use of the TLP and the signing of the MAA also tackle another obstacle to in-
teroperability, namely issues concerning classified data and trust. (Pollock & Coles, 2015) 
 
One of the issues that must also be considered is the extent of the interoperability between 
organisations. What is the minimum level required for a framework such as Krivat to function, 
what is the ideal, and what is too much? As the framework develops, this issue will likely be 
considerd alongside others. 
 
2.3 Crisis communication 
 
Organisational communication and, more specifically, crisis communication has been re-
searched thoroughly over the years. In this thesis, crisis communication is used to refer to the 
communication of organisations involved in the management of the crisis situation. This thesis 
does not consider intra-organisational communication during a crisis nor communication to 
media or other stakeholders.  
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Osmo A. Wiio stated in his laws of human communication that communication usually fails, 
except by accident. He went on to state that if the message could be interpreted in different 
ways, it will most likely be interpreted in the way that will cause the most damage. His fourth 
law of human communication is perhaps the most significant for the Krivat concept: the more 
communication there is, the more it will fail. The significance for Krivat being here that the 
more information is exchanged between organisations, the more likely it is that something 
can, and therefore will, go wrong. (Wiio, cited in Merimaa, 2008) 
 
Responsibilities for communication are also an issue that cause problems. Depending on the 
organisation, communication can be seen as the responsibility of specific individuals, or a 
joint responsibility. However, if no one is named as responsible for communication, it be-
comes more likely that no one will communicate anything. It is seen as the job of ‘someone 
else’, or thought that ‘someone will take care of this’. During a multi-organisation response 
to a disturbance, these responsibilities can get even more confused and impact the effect of 
the response. (Juholin, 2006) 
 
Communication, especially in a multi-organistaion environment, is not a one directional pro-
cess where messages go from one direction to another and are immediately understood by the 
receipient. There are several theories and models related to communications and sense-
making of the messages.  Individuals attach different meanings to different messages depend-
ing on their backgrounds and their surroundings, and therefore the lack of common terminol-
ogy is often an issue. This point has also implications for shared situation awareness, dis-
cussed more in depth in a later chapter. (Juholin, 2006) 
 
Communication and information exchange have been identified as one of the defining charac-
teristics of interoperability. Since they have an integral part to play in creating interoperabil-
ity, it stands to reason also that if these are not achieved, they become barriers to interoper-
ability. Success of communication is also one determining factor in the overall success of a 
crisis response. The benchmarking research conducted for this thesis surveys preparedness 
exercises in light of, among other things, the characteristics of interoperability. (Pollock & 
Coles, 2015) 
 
2.4 Crisis management 
 
In dictionary terms, crisis management is defined as “a set of procedures applied in handling, 
containment, and resolution of an emergency in planned and coordinated steps” (Business 
Dictionary, 2015). Characteristic to crisis management are the need to make decisions quickly 
and reactivity; crisis management activities usually occur after an incident. Pearson and Clair 
(1998) define organisational crisis management as “a systematic attempt by organizational 
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members with external stakeholders to avert crises or to effectively manage those that do 
occur.”  
 
Pearson and Clair define an organisational crisis as “a low-probablity, high-impact event that 
threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, 
and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decision must be made swiftly.” (Pearson 
& Clair, 1998) Comparing this definition to the positioning of Krivat illustrated in figure 1, we 
see that strictly according to this definition, situations for which the Krivat was developed do 
not fall under the heading ‘crisis’. Chapter 2.1 introduces the concept of major disturbance, 
which is used much in Finnish contingency planning discourse. 
 
Successful crisis management efforts enable organizations to sustain or resume their opera-
tions, minimise losses to stakeholders, and lead to meaningful learning to manage future inci-
dents. In the context of Krivat, these efforts are undertaken together by several organisations 
from various sectors, for which reason the term multi-organisational crisis management is 
used. (Pearson & Clair, 1998) 
 
The cycle of Krivat activities has often been described as a figure eight with one cycle of ac-
tions during disturbances and one cycle during preparation. The first cycle would be thought 
of as the crisis management cycle, where the community reacts together to a disruptive 
event as quickly and as efficiently as it can, and the second cycle is the so-called CIP cycle, 
where the lines between the organisations are again more clearly defined and organisations 
plan for the next event. Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 2.7. 
 
Boin and McConnell (2007) argue that traditional crisis management responses and contingen-
cy planning approaches are very limited when it comes to critical infrastructure breakdowns. 
They criticize the prevention aspect of crisis management as ineffective, since its success 
relies on knowledge and understanding of the source and dynamics of the threats. Contingen-
cy planning can be effective to a point, however in many cases can cause overconfidence. 
 
Harrald (2006) argued that discipline and agility must both be ensured whenever designing 
organizational systems or software for emergency response. He identified three themes de-
scribing the essential elements of response to extreme events. Harrald also named critical 
success factors, which are the key areas of activity where success is vital for the end result to 
be successful. One of his critical success factors is in the area of initial reaction and mobiliza-
tion and calls for “situational awareness” being “obtained and shared across a distributed 
organisational network”. Pollock and Coles (2015) mention shared situation awareness as one 
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element on which effective response and collaboration depend on, and which is discussed in 
the next section.  
 
2.5 Shared situation awareness (SSA) 
 
MacFarlane and Leigh (2014) define situational awareness (SA) as “the state of the individual 
and/or collective knowledge relating to past and current events, their implications, and po-
tential future developments.” Simply put, they present SSA as the things that should be com-
monly understood by all those involved in a situation, so that the collective response will be 
swift and effective.  
 
Harrald and Jefferson present this widely accepted definition by Endsley for situational 
awareness: “-- the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future.” (Endsley, cited in Harrald & Jefferson, 2007) They point out that situational aware-
ness is more than just a “correct perception of reality”, it is “the correct perception of the 
relevant elements of the current reality necessary for correct, protective, tactical, and stra-
tegic response.” 
 
The most widely accepted model of SA divides it into three levels: perception, comprehension 
and projection. Level 1 SA is the basic information that a person needs to function in their 
work. It does not require any additional mental processing. Level 2 requires some processing 
and is an evaluation of the current situation. To attain level 2 SA a person needs, in addition 
to the basic knowledges neede for level 1 SA, the ability to evaluate the magnitude of the 
incident, the reason behind the incident and its relation to other incidents. Level 3 SA is the 
highest level of SA, and requires mental processing and an ability to estimate future events 
based on the current situation. (Endsley, 2015; Rummukainen et al. 2015) 
 
There are a number of problems associated with shared situational awareness (SSA) that have 
to do with the interpretation of the data, especially as it concerns semantic meaning, percep-
tion of information, implications and data quality. Since a significant part of attaining SA has 
to do with interpretation of data, it becomes plain how different meanings attached to the 
data or mismatched terminology can be an issue.  (Harrald & Jefferson, 2007) 
 
In the case of Krivat, the most pressing concerns are those relating to data quality, percep-
tion of information and the implications associated with the data. Krivat provides users much 
automated data from various sources, however without a way to ensure the timeliness and 
completeness of the data, the content becomes meaningless. This is, however, a techincal 
concern, and therefore manageable with improvements to the actual system to for example 
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time stamp the data. Perception of information and the implications that the users associate 
with the data are more difficult.  
 
The Krivat community is very heterogeneous, meaning that it is likely the various recepients 
can interpret the data provided in various ways. Based on their backgrounds, experiences and 
the surrounding organisation, they may also have different implications and requirements for 
future action. (Harrald & Jefferson, 2007) 
 
MacFarlane and Leigh (2014) also recognise the difficulty related to interpretation of data. 
They also point out problems such as teams making incorrect assumptions about the capabili-
ties of other teams, or expertise not being made available to the joint effort. 
  
Exercises are one way of potentially bridging the gaps in information perception and implica-
tions between the different organisations. Exercises might also be a way to drive home the 
point that since not everyone shares the same terminology, concepts or even signs and sym-
bols, it pays to be careful with choice of words, to challenge assumed meanings and to check 
if the message is being understood. 
 
2.6 Business Continuity Management (BCM)  
 
The aim of BCM activities is to enable the organisation to prepare for and cope with emergen-
cies that affect its operative capabilities. In essence, it is about identifying what is essential 
for your organisation and then making plans in case something happens to those essential 
parts.  
 
Stuart Hotchkiss (2010) refers to BCM as the management of the different steps of business 
continuity. This entails regular review of the business impacts and the risks, designing proce-
dures or updating existing ones in light of changed risks or necessary resources, regular staff 
training and communicating with the staff, regular testing of plans and regular audits. Having 
planning without management leads, according to Hotchkiss, to outdated plans that fail more 
often than not. 
 
The BCM lifecycle begins with the production of two documents: a document to “express the 
strategic intent of a company to include continuity in its regulatory capabilities or as some 
kind of competitive differentiator” (Hotchkiss, 2010, 6) and a BCM policy.  
 
Hotchkiss presents a BCM lifecycle with eight steps, with governance at the centre. The pro-
cess begins with a business impact analysis (BIA) to understand the organisation and the func-
tions which have the highest impact on the operation of the organisation. After a BIA, a 
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threat analysis is conducted for a view of the threats and current countermeasures. Third 
step is risk assessment to further analyse the risks represented by the threats. Fourth, based 
on the potential risks, a set of scenarios is designed. Fifth step is to then document proce-
dures to counter the risk scenarios. Sixth, these procedures must be tested in order to deter-
mine their efficacy. Seventh, as a result of the testing, is to update capabilities to match 
needs, and finally, these capabilities should be audited, leading to a new BIA and corrective 
action. This cycle is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 2: The BCM lifecycle (Hotchkiss 2010, 7) 
 
Joining the Krivat community is not meant as a replacement for the BCM activities of the or-
ganisation. It is also not a channel for the companies to outsource their continuity activities.  
One condition for the organisations looking to join the community is that they have the ability 
to cope with smaller scale (low impact and low or high predictability, see Fig. 1) situations on 
their own. Krivat is useful to an organisation only when it knows what it needs to protect, 
what its priorities are and how it usually goes about protecting those assets.    
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2.7 Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
 
In general terms, critical infrastructure (CI) comprises both the physical structures and the 
services considered to vital to the continued functioning of the society. In order to protect 
these, the individual critical areas must be identified and secured, while at the same time 
keeping in mind the functionality of the entire infrastructure. (Hagelstam, 2005)  
 
In Finland, CI has been divided into seven sectors: energy production, transmission and distri-
bution networks, data-communication systems, networks and services, financial services, 
transport and logistics, water supply, construction and maintenance of infrastructure, and 
waste management in special circumstances. (NESA a, 2013) 
 
According to Hagelstam, there are three dimensions to CIP, which need to be balanced: polit-
ical, technical and economical. The political dimension consists of the national legislation and 
national security needs and the international co-operation around these needs. The aim is to 
arrive at similar solutions that would enable co-operation between countries with correspond-
ingly similar needs. Countries with shared critical infrastructure benefit from consistent legis-
lation and security policies.  
 
The economical dimension consists of the companies and other financial actors responsible 
for building and maintaining critical infrastructure, and which operate according to their eco-
nomic interests. The private sector has a very strong ownership of the CI structures and ser-
vices in Finland, which leads to the economical dimension of CIP having more importance. 
Companies operate for profit, and therefore supporting their operation with public funds 
would distort the operating of the market. Companies operating critical infrastructure are 
engaged in competition, not in charity. 
 
The technical dimension consists of the advancement and utilization of technical solutions. 
All those actions and solutions that governments and organisations take in practice to protect 
their CI fall into this domain.  
 
In Finland, the businesses have always been an active participant in preparedness and protec-
tion of critical infrastructures through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). According to the PPP 
Knowledge Lab, a PPP is “a long-term contract between a private party and a government 
entitity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant 
risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance.” (NESA b, 
2013; PPP Knowledge Lab, 2015) 
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The Krivat concept is a prime example of a CIP solution balancing all three dimensions. For 
one, it takes advantage of the available technology to offer organisations a secure communi-
cations solution for dire circumstances. The concept and the technology utilized are also con-
stantly developed to maintain the high standard necessary. The costs for the maintenance 
and use of the system have been equally divided among the participants, and the legal 
agreements written for the purpose take into account market laws. The current political at-
mosphere supports the ideas of cost-effectiveness, best practices and mutual aid across mu-
nicipalities that are at the core of the concept. 
 
2.8 Crisis management exercises 
 
Crisis management exercises are events with managed and goal-oriented activities taking the 
form of seminars, workshops, syndicate progressives, hypotheticals, drills, functional exercis-
es, field exercises, or some combination of these. The appropriate style of exercise is chosen 
based on the aim, objectives and scope of the exercise, however factors such as training 
needs, budget and availability of participants may also have an influence. (AEMI, 2012)  
 
Crisis management exercises have generally been thought to have several benefits to organi-
sations. Exercises are thought to develop different skills relevant to handling crises, they can 
test the readiness and the procedures of the organisation, the participants have a chance to 
meet and form contacts that can help in a crisis situation, and exercises can lead to the dis-
covery of critical deficiencies in the systems of the organisation. (Ingemarsdotter & Trané, 
2013) 
 
The AEMI handbook “Managing Exercises” makes a rather bold statement when it asserts that 
“the success of an exercise depends on whether a structured approach has been adopted.” 
This would imply that, as long as the exercise is planned and conducted according to a struc-
tured principle, it will be successful. What actually constitutes a success is not made clear. Is 
it an exercise that has simply fulfilled its aim? And on the other hand, is an exercise that has 
not fulfilled its aim just a waste of time and other resources? 
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Relatively little research has been done on the usefulness and actual benefits of exercises. 
Such research has, however, important implications for anyone wishing to plan and conduct a 
useful exercise. Berlin and Carlström (2015) found in their study of perceptions of usefulness 
and learning in collaboration exercises that “learning during collaboration does not -- fully 
prepare employees for actual emergency work”. According to their findings, a faily large 
amount of respondents felt that the exercises were inconsistent with their normal work. If 
the aim of the exercise is to test procedures or simply drill operations, an exercise which has 
little to do with how things normally work is not a succesfull exercise, no matter how struc-
tured the approach to it has been.  
 
3 Research method 
 
This thesis utilizes two research methods to achieve three main objectives. This chapter de-
scribes first the research questions and the objectives of the thesis, then the methods used to 
answer the questions and finally the implementation. The results are in their own chapter, 
following this. 
 
3.1 Research questions 
 
The main objective of this thesis is a development goal to find ways to facilitate interopera-
bility between organisations participating in the Krivat framework so that they would not hes-
itate to use the tools offered by the concept. To reach this goal one of the issues that must 
be considered is communications and collaboration in multi-organisation responses, which 
have been discussed in the theoretical framework. 
 
Based on the available literature, it was determined that interoperability has certain re-
quirements which, if not fulfilled, become barriers to interoperability. This formed the basis 
for the main research question: 
 
 1. How to facilitate interoperability requirements in Krivat? 
 
Two secondary questions were also formed: 
 
2. How effective is a user introduction as a way to facilitate interoperability? 
3. What kind of an exercise would be the most useful as a facilitator of interioperability. 
 
Since the Krivat framework is a unique and new solution to disturbance management, there 
are, at least in theory, no existing comparative methods to unlearn. In practice, every organi-
sation has their own previous ways of coping with disturbances, therefore the user introduc-
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tion must be an attitude adjusting event as well as a way to teach new users how the system 
works. The effect of the user introductions was researched using the action research method, 
with three Krivat user introduction events as material. 
 
On the other hand, literature would also suggest that crisis management or preparedness ex-
ercises could be an effective method to teach organisations to collaborate during a disturb-
ance response. This question was researched by benchmarking successful and unsuccessful 
exercise experiences. 
 
The research methods as well as the reasons for choosing those methods are clarified in more 
detail in the following section. 
 
3.2 Research methods 
 
The primary research method used in this thesis was action research, due to the active role 
this research method allows for the researcher and its focus on practical applications. This 
method was used to develop the information exchange between Krivat community members 
and to research the elements that could aid in facilitating open communication and shared 
situation awareness between organisations. Choosing action research as the primary method 
has also the added benefit of allowing for more control in terms of gaining meaningful results, 
in that by means of intervention and observation the research would yield meaningful data in 
any case.    
 
The aim of action research is to change things during the course of the research process and 
to get more exact knowledge about specific situations. Development of new skills, approaches 
or solutions to problems is at the core of this method, and the researcher intervenes actively 
in real-life events and considers the effects of the intervention. (Anttila, 2007) 
 
Action research has a cyclical nature, and one research project usually runs through two cy-
cles. The illustration below shows the process as it runs from the initial planning phase 
through action, observation and reflection to a new, revised planning phase, which initiates 
the second cycle of the research. (Anttila, 2007) 
 
A secondary research method utilized in this thesis is benchmarking. This method is used in 
this thesis to determine the types of structures or elements that would be most beneficial for 
the Krivat community to foster cooperation and interoperatbility.  
 
Benchmarking is a process for obtaining a measure of what is the best performance being 
achieved. The focus in benchmarking is on best practices and continuous improvement. In 
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business environment, benchmarking is mainly used for achieving competitive advantage by 
identifying best practices from other organisations and implementing that knowledge to fix 
gaps in the own processes of the organization. (Stroud, 2015)  
 
3.3 Implementation of action research 
 
As the intervention for the action research, the Krivat user introduction was modified to in-
clude new elements that were determined by the available literature and the previous expe-
riences with the introductions of the researcher herself. 
 
Every new user of the Krivat system receives an introduction to the system and the concept in 
general, as organized by ERVE. As an intervention for the action research, a short discussion 
exercise was added to the introduction to activate the users and to encourage the users to 
think about how the system is useful to their goals during a major disturbance situation and 
what they could achieve by making effective use of the system. This exercise was conducted 
and observed by the researcher.  
 
This type of intervention serves two objectives. For one, it provides a way to influence the 
participants to consider Krivat as a tool to enable effective management of a complicated 
situation, and to activate the participants to think about the system in the context of their 
own working environment and how they can make the best use of the system. It would also 
bring out any shortcomings the participants might have about information exchange or the 
cooperative process of the Krivat system in general. Second, this intervention type also 
demonstrates the viability of one type of an exercise for the Krivat community. 
 
The modified introduction was carried out in two organisations. The scenario used in the ex-
ercise was modified for each organization. The report on the summer storms of 2010 by the 
Safety Investigation Authority was used as  source material for the scenarios. 
 
The starting point for the exercise was a situation where the organization learns of an ap-
proaching storm. They were asked to consider the situation as they usually experience it, 
what has to happen at their organisation at every stage. After considering the current situa-
tion, they were asked to consider where they could use Krivat to help manage the situation. 
 
The situation then escalated through the stages of the crisis, where at each stage the partici-
pants had a few minutes to discuss the situation, what should happen and how Krivat could 
help in the management of that stage of the disturbance. 
 22 
 
3.4 Implementation of benchmarking 
 
For benchmarking the researcher observed the regional preparedness exercise of Southern 
Finland preparedness committee, conducted on 5 November 2015 in Santahamina. Additional 
data was gathered by surveying a selected group on their experiences regarding crisis man-
agement exercises, focusing on those experiences they considered the most successful. 
 
The survey consisted of six questions. First, the responders were asked to think of two to 
three preparedness or crisis management exercises which they considered successful experi-
ences. They were asked to give a general description of these, consisting of scope, duration, 
aims, and the type of the exercise. They were then asked to in their own words describe what 
made these exercises successful. 
 
To determine how these exercises could have affected interoperability, the respondents were 
then asked to  rate their positive experiences as a whole on a likert scale. They were asked 
how they thought the exercises had improved or clarified the following factors, which have 
been identified as characteristic to interoperability or problematic to it if they are lacking: 
trust, collaboration, communication and information exchange, clarity of superordinate goals, 
task interdependence, common operational picture, organisational structure in a multi-
organisation response, and collective accountability. (Pollock & Coles, 2015) 
 
After answering questions regarding their positive exercise experiences, the respondents were 
asked to answer similar questions regarding exercises that they considered unsuccessful. They 
were first asked to briefly describe the exercises (scope, duration, aims, type or exercise) 
and then to in their own words describe why they considered these exercises unsuccessful.  
 
As with the positive experiences, they were asked to rate how they thought these unsuc-
cesfull exercises clarified or improved the interoperability characteristics. Even though the 
subjective experience of the participants may have been that these exercises were unsuc-
cesfull, it is possible that they still had an effect on these characteristics. 
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The survey was sent to six participants with extensive experience as participants in different 
types of preparedness or crisis management exercises. Although five of the six participants 
currently work for ERVE, all of them have varied backgrounds from different organisations 
both in the public and private sectors. 
 
The survey data was gathered using Surveymonkey. Surveymonkey allows for all the answers 
of individual particiapants to be viewed together, thereby enabling the linking of specific an-
sers together.   
 
4 Results 
 
This chapter describes the results of the action research and the bencmarking and discusses 
the scientific validity of the reserach. The different research efforts focused on different as-
pects of the concept, but to summarize the results, the action research yielded useful data 
for the development of Krivat training and the benchmarking, on the other hand, resulted in 
ideas for conducting larger exercises with the Krivat community.  
 
4.1 Action research 
 
The intervention for the action research was initially supposed to be carried out three times, 
once in two different organisations and a second round in one of the organisations, however 
the Valio storm of 2 October 2015 provided the researcher an opportunity to gather data 
based on a real situation. The scenario used in the intervention was slightly modified for the 
second cycle, based on the experiences and feedback from the first cycle, experiences from 
Valio storm and additional learning by the researcher.  
 
4.1.1 Observations 
 
Observations from the first intervention cycle are very much a case of “you have to start 
somewhere”. This was the first time the Krivat introduction had been conducted in this man-
ner, so it established a baseline in that respect. It was also the first time the researcher at-
tempted her hand at scenario formation for any kind of management exercise. The following 
chart lists the observations from the first cycle intervention at Organisation A (a telecommu-
nications operator). 
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Number Observation Notes 
Observation 1 Having slides on one screen and live system 
on other simultaneously a good solution. 
Prevents mix-ups and confu-
sion due to having to change 
feeds. 
Observation 2 General athmosphere seemed conducive to 
learning. 
The introduction was ar-
ranged for a day when the 
staff had a general training 
day. 
Observation 3 KRIVAT introduction was the last item of the 
day, how much did this influence the discus-
sions etc.? 
Second cycle intervention 
has been scheduled as the 
first item on a later general 
staff training day. 
Observation 4 The senior staff members spoke the most. The senior staff members 
kept the discussion going. 
One of the staff members 
had been involved with de-
velopment of the concept 
and was able to explain many 
things in terms of relevance 
to the organization. 
Observation 5 Scenario had some key values that caused 
discussion, however the general flow of dis-
cussion was slow. 
Only two or three partici-
pants actively taking part in 
the discussion, not taking 
much stand in effectiveness 
of the system. 
Observation 6 Due to unfamiliarity with the ways of the 
organization the researcher could not stimu-
late the discussion much. 
Some insights were gained 
from this intervention. 
Observation 7 Was the operative staff untalkative because 
they were expecting the senior staff mem-
bers to speak or because they had nothing 
to say on the subject? 
Consideration for second cy-
cle intervention. 
Observation 8 Scenario needs to be amended for the sec-
ond cycle at this organization. 
Consider to what extent 
should the scenario be 
amended for the first cycle 
intervention at the second 
organization. 
 Table 1: Observations from first cycle intervention at Organisation A 
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After the introduction, it was observed that for a while Organisation A consistently has the 
largest amount of logged-in users (six out of 18 for that organization) in Krivat. During the 
storm response to Valio on 2 October, Organisation A also actively made use of the Krivat ser-
vices available so far. Before the storm the organization requested additional usernames to 
be added for their personnel.  
 
Management staff at Organisation A has been active in promoting and developing Krivat and 
this undoubtedly has a effect on the positive response of the operative staff.  
 
The second cycle intervention was conducted roughly a month after the first cycle at the 
same organisation. Between the cycles there has been one incident that can be classified as a 
major disturbance and where Krivat was used as a tool, also at Organisation A. The staff par-
ticipating in the training had not received any prior Krivat training, aside from two partici-
pants. There were nine participants at the second training event. The table below lists the 
observations and notes from the event. 
 
Number Observation Notes 
Observation 1 General atmosphere of the event was more 
discussion-oriented. 
However there was not 
enough real interaction be-
tween participants, the dis-
cussion was mostly dialogue 
between “lecturer” and one 
participant. There were 
more questions from the par-
ticipants. 
Observation 2 Slides had been modified based on the ex-
periences from the previous training event 
and other experience of the “lecturer” 
Scenario remained the same 
aside from some minor ad-
justments to discussion times 
to prevent awkward silences. 
Observation 3 Discussion about the scenario had to steered 
by the “lecturer”, with comments such as: 
“From what I’ve seen, this could be helpful 
because…” 
The participants who had 
participated in the previous 
training event made it clear 
they would not speak here, 
forcing the other participants 
to speak up. 
 26 
 
Observation 4 The refusal of those who had participated in 
the previous event to “bail out” the others 
during the scenario discussion helped to 
generate conversation. 
The scenario exercise 
seemed somewhat more suc-
cesful this time due to the 
slightly livelier exchange of 
thoughts. 
 Table 2: Observations from the second-cycle intervention at Organisation A 
 
4.1.2 Reflection 
 
The active positive attitude of the senior staff members at Organisation A is undoubtedly re-
sponsible for the active use of Krivat at the organization. Numerous studies have shown the 
positive correlation between staff attitudes towards a change and management approval and 
investment.  
 
During the response to Valio storm none of the organisations involved demonstrated any par-
ticular willingness to volunteer any extra information to one another or to co-operate, aside 
from the automated disruption information, however one recently joined organisation (a res-
cue department) utilised the system to specifically request additional information from one of 
the information providers. As the user base grows, any such interoperability issues should be-
come more clear, if they exist.  
 
Since the size and reach of the system so far is limited, it is also difficult to estimate if the 
use of the Krivat system was particularly successful in that the users would have known how 
to effectively use the data and the communications system during the response. Those organ-
isations that have used the system for longest do demonstrate a willingness to consider and 
try different applications for the system. 
 
Based on these observations, one could argue that using the Krivat introduction as a means to 
ingrain the idea of interoperability and information exchange into the users could be very ef-
fective. In order to make the introduction more concrete and tie the use of the system into 
the activities of the user organisation, less time should be spent on the features of the system 
and more on the application. 
 
The observations detailed above and the experiences from the Valio storm were used to 
amend the scenario and the training materials for the second cycle intervention at Organisa-
tion A. The changes included more emphasis on the information exchange rules with more 
concrete examples.  
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Between the first cycle and the second cycle interventions, the researcher also participated 
in a training event focusing on presentation and training skills. The materials for the second 
cycle intervention were also amended based on the skills learned at this event. If the user 
introduction is as useful a tool in facilitating not only learning a new system but also as an 
attitude adjustor, then any improvements in the material or in the delivery of the introduc-
tion itself can only help in getting the message across.         
 
4.2 Benchmarking 
 
The benchmarking effort was conducted in two parts: by observation and by survey. This sec-
tion describes the results gained from the observations and the survey.  
 
4.2.1 Survey questions 
 
The aim of the survey was to gather experiences of crisis management exercises, focusing on 
what made a particular exercise experience succesfull or unsuccessful in the opinion of the 
surveyed. In addition to this, the survey asked the participants to rate how they saw these 
exercises improve or clarify the factors that have been found to be characteristic to interop-
erability. 
 
The aim was to establish wether it is justifiable to use the time and resources needed to con-
duct a crisis management exercise to build separate exercises for Krivat, or if the information 
exchange and interoperability problems could be tackled by some other means. 
 
The survey consisted of six questions in Finnish. The table below lists the translated questions 
and what information was sought with them. Appendix 1 has a list of the questions in the 
form they were sent to the receipients. 
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Number Question Aim of the question 
1 Think of two to three crisis management exercises 
that have in your opinion been successful events. 
Briefly describe these exercises (scope, duration, 
aims, type etc.). 
This question was meant to 
provide background infor-
mation on what kind of exer-
cise events the responders 
saw as successful. 
2 Which elements in your opinion  made these 
events successful? 
The aim here was to identify 
if there were any prevailing 
elements that affected the 
success of an event or if 
these were subjective. 
3 Please rate how much in your opinion the exercis-
es developed or clarified the following: mutual 
trust, cooperation, information exchange and 
communication, clarity of the aims of prepared-
ness work, task interdependencies, COP needs, 
organisation structure in a multi-organisation re-
sponse, and joint responsibility.  
These elements have been 
found to characterize in-
teroperability, and the aim 
of this question was to see if 
the successful exercises from 
the previous questions could 
also develop these. 
4 Think of two or three crisis management exercises 
that have in your opinion been unsuccessful 
events. Briefly describe these exercises (scope, 
duration, aims, type etc.). 
This question was again 
meant to provide background 
information for the next 
questions. 
5 Which elements in your opinion made these events 
unsuccessful? 
The aim here was to identify 
the pitfalls as experienced by 
the participants. 
6 Please rate how much in your opinion the exercis-
es developed or clarified the following: mutual 
trust, cooperation, information exchange and 
communication, clarity of the aims of prepared-
ness work, task interdependencies, COP needs, 
organisation structure in a multi-organisation re-
sponse, and joint responsibility. 
Question 6 was identical to 
question 3. The aim was to 
see if an exercise that the 
participants felt was unsuc-
cessful could still be useful.  
 Table 3: Survey questions 
 
The results from these questions are discussed in the next section.  
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4.2.2 Survey results 
 
The survey was sent out to six individuals with varied, extensive backgrouds involving prepar-
edness or crisis management exercises. Out of these, five responses were gained. The re-
sponses were all useful data and they answered the questions that were being asked. There 
were two points that arose from the responses that might have been clarified with a larger 
sample size. 
 
The first question handled background information about the successful exercises referred to 
later on in the survey. All five responses referenced a different event. Many responses named 
a specific exercise by name. Two responses named specific TIETO-exercises as successful. A 
third response mentioned a joint exercise for information society actors, which might also be 
a reference to the TIETO-exercises, however this was unclear from the background infor-
mation. One response referenced a smaller exercise conducted just within their own organi-
sation. 
 
The second question asked the respondents to name the factors they saw as important to the 
success of the events. Here one response seems to have been submitted incompletely as it 
breaks off in the middle of a sentence.   
 
Three responses mention the exercise being wide in scope (laaja-alainen) or some equivalent 
as a factor. Three responses also mentioned realism or some synonym of it. The correct par-
ticipants or some equivalent phrase was also mentioned by three participants. 
 
Two responses mention good planning, organisation at location and good common communca-
tions systems as influences to the success of the events. 
 
One response mentions the participant’s own active participation in preparing for the exer-
cise and during the event itself, implying that no matter how well an exercise is planned and 
carried out, if the participants themselves do not feel like actively participating they will very 
likely view the event as a waste of their time. 
 
One response mentioned the exercise handling situations from outside of normal work, ena-
bling preparation for situations not often encountered.  
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The table below lists all the factors mentioned. 
 
Factor Phrases used in responses 
Width of exercise scope Exercise included and noted all stakeholders 
in a real situation 
 Different actors were well represented 
Wide representation from different groups 
Realism Realistic training situations 
 Stakeholders during a real situation  
Discussion based on the resources and capa-
bilities of stakeholders, not just imagining 
what those might be. 
Good organisation Good operating instructions during exercise 
 Preparations starting a year before the event 
Good organisation at the exercise location 
Correct participants Having the right people at the same physical 
location 
Active participation Participant’s own active participation in ex-
ercise 
 Participant engagement to the exercise 
Communication systems Good common communications systems to 
exchange information during the exercise 
Table 4: Factors that made exercises successful 
  
In question three, respondents were asked to rate to what extent the exercises referenced 
developed or clarified the following elements: mutual trust, information exchange and com-
munication, cooperation, clarity of aims, task interdependencies, COP needs, organisation 
structure in a multi-organisation response, and joint responsibility. The scale was a likert 
scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = do not know, 4 = moderately, 5 = significant-
ly). 
 
In summary, most respondents considered the exercises had clarified or developed at least 
moderately all but the organisation structure in multi-organisation response. This is somewhat 
surprising since many of the exercises named in the first question were multi-organisation 
cooperation exercises. 
 
All respondents rated the exercises as having clarified or developed task interdependencies. 
One response had rated the effect here as significant (5), the other four as moderate (4). COP 
needs were developed or clarified moderately in two responses and significantly in two, with 
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the fifth opting for do not know (3). Joint responsibility was impacted moderately in the opin-
ion of four respondents, with the fifth again opting for do no know. Cooperation was devel-
oped or clarified significantly in the opinion of four respondent, whereas fifth respondent saw 
cooperation being developed only a little (2). 
 
The table below illustrates the responses in detail. 
 
 1, not at all 2, a little 3, do not 
know 
4, moderate-
ly 
5, signifi-
cantly 
Mutual trust  1 1 2 1 
Cooperation  1   4 
Information ex-
change and com-
munication 
 1 1 1 2 
Clarity or aims  2  3  
Task interde-
pendencies 
   4 1 
COP needs   1 2 2 
Organisation 
structure 
 2 1 1 1 
Joint responsibil-
ity 
  1 4  
Table 5: Results for question 3 
 
Question four was again to gather background information for the exercise experiences that 
were unsuccessful in the opinion of the participants. One respondent answered that they have 
not participated in any exercises that they would consider unsuccessful as such. 
 
From the other four responses, interestingly enough, two “themes” emerged. This is where a 
larger sample size would probably have either further defined these two themes or would 
have provided more variation to the answers. 
 
Two of the responses mention a VALHA-exercise as an unsuccessful event, and two others 
mention multi-organisation cooperation exercises between rescue officials and defence forc-
es.  
 
In question five, detailing the factors behind these exercises being less than successful, three 
responses mention communication systems. All three mention a different aspect involving the 
communication systems, with one mentioning the exercise using communication systems still 
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in their development phase being used in the exercise, one mentioned a total lack of a com-
mon communications system and one mentioned an insufficient communications system being 
used at the exercise. 
 
Three responses mention a lack of realism or some equivalent as an issue. One mentions the 
tendency of exercises becoming more like lectures and, on the other hand, time constraints 
forcing actions to be taken out of order during the exercise. Another response mentioned ac-
tivities becoming check point-type instead of connected activites based on the scenario and 
the “big picture”. 
 
Factor Phrases used in the responses 
Problems with communications systems Unfinished system or system in beta testing  
 Insufficient communication mechanism 
No common communication system, commu-
nication on paper 
Lack of realism “Exercise” was more like a lecture 
 Time constraints force actions out of order 
(simultaneousy instead of consequently, as 
would happen in reality) 
No touch to the real world 
Connection between scenario and activities 
during exercise 
Background scenario so weak that paartici-
pants could not orientate themselves to the 
exercise 
 Scenario and the “big picture” did not 
transmit to the participants 
No real-time situation awareness 
Table 6: Factors in unsuccessful exercises 
 
Question six asked the respondents to again rate their experiences impact on the same fac-
tors as in question three. The scale was also the same, a likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not at 
all, 5 = significantly, 3 = do not know). 
 
Even though the respondents considered the exercises unsuccessful, the exercises still had a 
moderate developing or clarifying effect on mutual trust, cooperation, COP needs and joint 
responsibility. However, there were also responses which considered there to be no effect at 
all (1) or only a small impact (2). 
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The table below illustrates the division of the responses. 
 
 1, not at all 2, a little 3, do not 
know 
4, moderate-
ly 
5, signifi-
cantly 
Mutual trust  2  3  
Cooperation  2  3  
Information ex-
change and 
communication 
1 2 1 1  
Clarity of aims 1 2  2  
Task interde-
pendency 
 3 1  1 
COP needs 1 1  2 1 
Organisation 
structure 
1 2 1 1  
Joint responsi-
bility 
 2  3  
       Table 7: Survey results for question 6 
 
In summary, the survey revealed considerations which need to be addressed either in devel-
opment of Krivat or when considering using Krivat as a tool during an exercise. These consid-
erations will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
4.2.3 Preparedness exercise observations 
 
The preparedness exercise observed was conducted in Santahamina on 5 November 2015 by 
the Construction pool and the Regional preparedness committee of Southern Finland. The ex-
ercise in question was a tabletop exercise, with a preliminary task sent out approximately a 
month before the event. The participants were specialist-level and mid-management employ-
ees from various private and public organisations. The exerscise lasted a full day, with first 
half of the day used for short orientation speeches and the second half of the day used for 
group work.  
 
According to the organisers, the division for the groups had been made so that there would be 
a mix of brach-specific and cross-field expertise in order to truly gain insights into issues such 
as interdependencies.  
 
For the sake of comparison, the exercise was observed using the same scale that was used in 
the survey. All in all, from the point of view of the observer, the exercise was successful. The 
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preliminary task and the scenario were well prepared. The speakers for the first half of the 
day spoke of relevant topics to the exercise and were well prepared for their speech. The 
task for the group work was well structured and considered the problem from different points 
of views.  
 
As a developer of mutual trust, the exercise was moderately successful. An important factor 
in building trust is to acquaint individuals from different organisations with one another. Peo-
ple trust those individuals they know and have judged trustworthy.  
 
It is one thing to conduct an exercise where everyone speaks about cooperation and then to 
bring the talk into action. Many of the organisations present recognised that in a major dis-
turbance many organisations may compete of the same limited resources and therefore coop-
eration is essential. Just talking about it during an exercise scenario may not be enough to 
bring about cooperation under a real disturbance situation, however it is a start. If it is being 
talked about, it is beng thought about, and therefore the exercises would seem to be at least 
a moderate success in this aspect as well. 
 
The exercise did not have much impact on information exchange and communications. There 
was no real time interaction between the groups during the group work phase and the scenar-
io did not develop during the phase so that it would have required any interaction. The groups 
had all the information that they needed, or at least all the information that they thought 
they neede. If there would have been development in the scenario during the group work 
phase and the groups would have needed to consult one another, there might have been ob-
servations about this aspect. 
 
In terms of the clarity of the goals of preparedness activities, they seemed to be somewhat 
clear to most participants in advance. The nature of these exercises is such that the same 
individuals participate in several such exercises and have in some cases been involved in the 
activities for several years. For a first time participant, the exercise clarified more what the 
activities and actors during a major disturbance are and not so much the higher level goals of 
the activities. 
 
In terms of task interdependencies, this exercise focused in part specifically on them. During 
the group work one of the main concerns was the interdependencies during the specified sce-
nario, and therefore this exercise developed the understanding of task interdependencies 
well.  
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Situtation awareness and common operating picture (COP) were a common topic throughout 
the day. There were two things that stood out from the discussions related to SA and COP. 
One was that there is a weariness related to all talk about SA and COP, they are seen as the 
fashionable concepts that everyone thinks is necessary. The second thing was, that in order to 
be fruitfull, discussion about SA and COP should be shifted from focusing on wether organisa-
tions need SA to what kind of SA they need. There was one statement which recognised this 
to a degree, calling for SA information that is somehow processed instead of raw data. Since 
the discussion was not really moved from the level of saying SA is necessary to the level 
where the more specific needs could have been addressed, the exercise cannot be said to 
have been very useful in terms of clarifying or developing SA and COP needs. 
 
The exercise did not take into account at all the organisational structure of a multi-
organisation disturbance response. The group work could have given thought to this issue, 
since it is a major obstacle in the way of functioning multi-organisation responses. The ques-
tion of who takes initiative to assemble a multi-organisation response structure is important. 
 
Joint responsibility was also not a concern of this exercise. The exercise participants focused 
more on the individual, specific responsibilities of the participating organisations. The issue 
of joint responsibility and the recognition of the issue is perhaps in the willingness of orgasa-
tions to actively consider the issues discussed in the exercise and to participate in such events 
to pool expert resources to solve as many of the problems as possible before any significant 
disturbance happens, but there was no explicit recognition, clarification or development in 
joint responsibility. 
 
4.3 Scientific validity 
 
Action research as a research method has been criticized as less scientifically rigorous as for 
example the different quantitative methods. The method allows the researcher to take a very 
active role in the process and the idea of objectivity is all but abandoned. For this thesis the 
method, however, worked well since the process under study was and is constantly improving 
and forcing it into a halt for the duration of the study might have caused damage to the actu-
al Krivat framework. It also allowed for less well working solutions and ideas to be discarded 
immediately instead of having to wait out the process.  
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For the survey, there are two main points of concern, namely the sample size and the ques-
tion formation. For a more representative view on the patterns revealed by the survey, a 
larger sample size would have been necessary. Since the point of the study was not to gener-
ate statistically significant results, the small sample size was deemed sufficient. The partici-
pants were selected on the basis of their backgrounds and experiences regarding the issue 
under study to ensure a wider variety of results. (Relevant Insights, 2011) 
 
The survey questions were reflective of the issue being studied, addressing the issue of con-
tent validity. Since the survey was done for benchmarking purposes, the internal validity of 
the survey was ensured by making certain the questions answered the correct issues. In terms 
of external validity, the small sample size prevents the results from being generalizable to a 
larger group. (Relevant Insights, 2011) 
 
Reliability of the survey can be called good, since the answers from it were consistent. The 
type of information gained was the same type, despite the background and experience of the 
respondent. (Relevant Insights, 2011) 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
This thesis had a main goal to develop the collaboration process of Krivat by  discussing the 
problems related to bringing various types of organisations. There were three research ques-
tions: 
 
1. How to facilitate interoperability in Krivat? 
2. How effective is a user introduction as a way to facilitate interoperability? 
3. What kind of an exercise would be the most useful as a facilitator of interoperability? 
 
In general, this thesis gives an idea of good ways to facilitate interoperability. Issues such as 
shared situation awareness and interoperability alone could by themselves be topics for a the-
sis, and therefore the theory introduced in this thesis is a scratch of the surface. It does, 
however, provide a starting point and has clarified the issues which, in turn, will make fur-
ther study and familiarization easier. 
 
It was difficult to assess the effectiveness of the user introduction event and, in hidsight, the 
question should have been phrased differently. As a process the action research did yield in-
sight into the user introduction event and how to improve it through the reflection phase of 
the process.  
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The question for the benchmarking was answered better by the research than the question 
for the action research. The answers gave a good idea of exercising in general as a useful fa-
cilitator of interoperability, and in addition gave examples of exercises that had, in the opin-
ion of the respondents, clarified or developed several of the interoperability characteristics 
specified by Pollock and Coles (2015).  
 
One of the main conclusions drawn from all the work involved in the thesis is that as Krivat 
stands now, trying to build an exercise or even a template for a series of exercises may not 
be the best use for the resources of the Krivat administration. The organisations involved in 
Krivat are already actively involved in many exercise organisations, and therefore adding an-
other time- and resource consuming exercise would not add anything significantly different to 
warrant the drain on resources. More efficient than trying to come up with own exercises for 
the Krivat framework would be to actively include the use of Krivat into the existing exercises 
administered by the regional preparedness organisation, for example. 
 
Smaller exercises are usefull as activators in user training events and to keep users active. 
One of the dangers for the framework at the moment is the disuse, that is, the large amounts 
of time the systems remains unused between disturbances. Smaller, even organisation specif-
ic exercises would help users to remember Krivat as a viable option, otherwise the response 
during a live crisis may be to fall back on same old routines. As was pointed out by one survey 
response, time constraints forced activities to happen out of order (simultaneously instead of 
consequtively as would be the real sequence of events) which diminishes the value of the ex-
ercise. A full scale exercise either using Krivat or within the Krivat operating environment 
would be very likely to stumble upon this same problem, due to the nature of major disturb-
ances and responses to them usually lasting days.  
 
In terms of exercising helping to establish interoperability, the benchmarking done for this 
thesis suggests that it is useful. To ensure this, interoperability characteristics should be con-
sidered in the planning and preparation of the exercise. Even those exercises which the sur-
veyed found were unsuccessfull, developed or clarified many of the interoperability charac-
teristics at least moderately.  
 
All those surveyed thought that their successful exercise experiences either developed or 
clarified task interdependencies. Most also saw developments or more clarity in cooperation, 
communication and information exchange, COP needs, and joint responsibility. A larger sam-
ple size likely would have given either more variation in the responses or it would have 
strengthened the results gained from the small sample, provided there would have been more 
actual responses.  
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The small sample size for the survey was justifiable for two reasons. For one, the actual an-
swers held valuable information in the open questions. The benchmarking was not the prima-
ry research effort for this thesis and therefore the amount of responses was sufficient, since 
care was taken to ensure the responders had varied backgrounds and extensive experience 
with participating in crisis management or preparedness exercises. Even if the actual sample 
size would have been larger, for example 15, but without a significant increase in the amount 
of responses, the end result would not have changed. 
 
The literature review for this thesis revealed several development objects that should be 
handled before any exercises specifically using Krivat are to take place. One such item were 
rules describing the communication responsibilities during a disturbance. This need came 
from the closer study of interoperability and the problematic issue of communication respon-
sibilities in general.  
 
Another development point that arose from the research was the point of processed infor-
mation to help situation awareness. Krivat is not a system for creating common operating pic-
ture, though it has elements of it. It is a system for SSA, and SSA requires more than just the 
bare necessities that could be found anywhere. There needs to be some added value to the 
information. What information to analyse and assess, how, and by whom? There is a huge pit-
fall in trying to interpret data for someone else, it stands to reason to ask if it should even be 
attempted in Krivat. 
 
Since information overload is a real issue, more data does not equal more information. This is 
a major topic to consider in the future development of the framework. It must be taken into 
account when adding new information providers to the community and in considering the ser-
vices of existing information providers. 
 
In general, as an activator of the Krivat users, the user introduction on its own is not the most 
efficient way. The user introduction is still too much of a lecture, and needs either an ath-
mosphere open to discussions or a more engaging small-scale exercise to activate the partici-
pants. This point became apparent during a series of introduction events after the action re-
search had already been conducted. 
 
The introduction was carried out a three new framework member organisations, using the 
introduction template with a short discussion exercise at the end. The biggest difference be-
tween these three events and the three events described in the action research was not in 
the introduction but in the person doing the talking. For these three events, there was in ad-
dition to myself two other colleagues present, who handled a significant portion of the talk-
ing. Due to their backgrounds in similar organisations and familiarity with the field, they were 
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able to generate an athmosphere where the users became enthusiastic about the framework 
and the discussion exercise became moot. This more than the actual action research suggests 
that the introduction can be an important tool in activating Krivat users to consider the 
framework and what the users could do with it. 
 
The introduction event is a necessary part of the process of organisations starting their Krivat 
use. Users must be shown what the system is capable of and how to use it. It is also apparent 
that small, engaging exercises must be conducted in order to keep Krivat in the minds of the 
users. Major disturbances such as the Valio storm are predictable and fairly common, however 
unless they become a monthly occurrence, they will not be so common as to activate Krivat 
users.  
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 Appendix 1 
 
Appendix 1: Original survey questions 
 
1. Palauta mieleesi 2-3 varautumisharjoitusta jotka ovat mielestäsi olleet onnistuneita tilai-
suuksia. Kuvaile harjoituksia lyhyesti (laajuus, kesto, harjoituksen tyyppi, tavoitteet jne.). 
 
2. Mitkä asiat tekivät mielestäsi näistä tilaisuuksista onnistuneita? 
 
3. Missä määrin harjoitukset kehittivät tai selkeyttivät seuraavia asioita: keskinäinen luotta-
mus, yhteistyö, tiedonvaihto ja kommunikaatio, varautumistoiminnan tavoitteiden selkeys, 
tehtävien keskinäiset riippuvuudet, tilannekuvatarpeet, organisaatiorakenne moniorganisaa-
tiovasteessa, yhteisvastuullisuus (asteikko 1-5, 1 = ei lainkaan, 5 = paljon, 3 = en osaa sanoa) 
 
4. Palauta mieleesi 2-3 varautumisharjoitusta jotka ovat mielestäsi olleet epäonnistuneita 
tilaisuuksia. Kuvaile tilaisuuksia lyhyesti (laajuus, kesto, harjoituksen tyyppi, tavoitteet yms.) 
 
5. Mitkä asiat tekivät mielestäsi näistä tilaisuuksista epäonnistuneita? 
 
6. Missä määrin harjoitukset kehittivät tai selkeyttivät seuraavia asioita: keskinäinen luotta-
mus, yhteistyö, tiedonvaihto ja kommunikaatio, varautumistoiminnan tavoitteiden selkeys, 
tehtävien keskinäiset riippuvuudet, tilannekuvatarpeet, organisaatiorakenne moniorganisaa-
tiovasteessa, yhteisvastuullisuus (asteikko 1-5, 1 = ei lainkaan, 5 = paljon, 3 = en osaa sanoa) 
 
